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THE ROLE OF LEGAL ADVISERS IN





International crises-such as those fueled by Nasser's 1956 nation-
alization of the Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company,' the 1961
Cuban Missile Crisis,2 and the 1985 terrorist hijacking of the Italian
cruise ship Achille Lauro 3-naturally excite the academic community.
In their quest to understand and analyze world events, scholars pre-
dictably pore over crucial documents compiled by the politicians, dip-
lomats, and lawyers who chronicled important details of a given crisis.
Through these papers, scholars can trace the input of these individuals
from the commencement of the international dispute until its resolu-
tion. But relying solely on such documents has shortfalls: their scope
is limited to detailing the events of a single crisis, and they tell only as
much about the translation of law into policy as is necessary to justify
the claims of the different actors. The documents do not serve to illus-
trate on a broader scale the extent to which foreign policy is controlled
by legal standards.
In order to appraise. the effectiveness of international law, I
* Professor of International Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
This research project has been financed partly by the European University Institute, and
partly by a grant of the Italian National Council for Research, research contract CNR No.
89.00981.09.
I would like to thank my former research associates, Ms. S. Marks, now a fellow of Emman-
uel College, Cambridge, and an assistant lecturer in international law at Cambridge University,
and Dr. A. Clapham, who is currently the Amnesty International representative to the United
Nations, for helping me with great skill and competence, both in drafting the questionnaires and
in interviewing a number of people. I am also beholden to Mr. M. Davidoff from the University
of Michigan Law School, and Ms. D. Warner from Yale Law School for assisting in the prepara-
tion of a first draft of this paper. Finally, I am most grateful to my secretary Ms. E. Zaccardelli,
for carefully transcribing all the taped interviews and typing up this paper.
1. For a discussion of the Suez Canal Crisis, see SELWYN LLOYD, SUEZ 1956: A PERSONAL
AccouNT (1978); Geoffrey Marston, Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis" The
Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government, 37 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 773 (1988).
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thought a different vantage point might prove useful-a vantage point
that is less academic and historical, and more action-oriented and
practical. I chose to look at how those people who, in their official
capacity, daily apply, interpret, and possibly suggest breaching inter-
national law. I set out to probe the attitude these individuals take
toward international legal standards. In particular, I wanted to ex-
amine the extent they are able or willing to use international legal
standards, and perhaps impress upon policymakers the idea that such
standards should be one of the guiding factors of foreign policy. To
put this different vantage point into practice, I resorted to a method
that is not normally used by international legal scholars: interviews.
With the help of a research team, I spoke to the people most re-
sponsible for using-or ignoring-international law today: present
and former foreign ministers and their chief legal advisers, hereafter
referred to as LAs.4 From them, I hoped to get direct and first-hand
evidence on the role played by international law in today's political
arena.5 I trust that by sounding them out as thoroughly as we did, it is
now possible to shed some light on the role played by law and lawyers
in foreign affairs. Part I of this essay will describe the LAs' role in
foreign policy-making and the institutional structure under which they
operate. Part II will explain how international law influences the ex-
tent foreign ministers will heed the LAs' advice and how LAs, in turn,
are able to influence the evolution of international law. In Part III, I
will summarize what we learned in our interviews. Finally, Part IV
4. Officials from the following countries were involved in the research project: Brazil-the
Legal Adviser [hereafter LA]; Bulgaria-the LA; Ireland-two former foreign ministers [hereaf-
ter FM], a former prime minister, a former attorney general, the LA, two members of the Office
of the Attorney General, a former LA, and a former Deputy LA; France-the LA and a former
LA; Hungary-the LA and a former LA; Israel-the LA and a former LA; Italy-the LA; the
Netherlands-a former FM, a former undersecretary for European affairs and the LA; Switzer-
land-the LA; the United Kingdom-the LA and a former Deputy LA; United States-a Dep-
uty LA, a member of the Office of the LA, a former LA, a former Deputy LA, and an assistant
general counsel to the Dept. of Defense.
5. Our commitment to all the interviewees to keep confidential some delicate issues raised in
our interviews has prompted me to refrain from both mentioning their names and referring to
special events or considerations that they regarded as strictly confidential. Our assurances of
confidentiality allowed our interviewees to tell us of events or positions not yet publicly known.
All officials and former officials were interviewed in private, often in their respective capitals, on
the basis of a long questionnaire.
Some of those who were interviewed in Florence also gave a public lecture on the topic and
published their remarks in Symposium, The Impact of International Law on Foreign Policy-Mak-
ing: The Role of LegalAdvisers, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 131, 132-64 (1991). The text of the lectures
include: Stephen M. Scheibel, Remarks on the Role of the Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Depart-
ment, id. at 132; Gilbert Buillaume, Droit international et action diplomatique: Le cas de la
France, id. at 136; Mathias Krafft, L'attitude de la Suisse d l'dgard du droit international, id at
148; Arthur D. Watts, International Law and International Relations: United Kingdom Practice,
id. at 157.
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will offer some suggestions for enhancing the role of international law
in developing foreign policy.
But first, I should note that our interviews are limited in two im-
portant ways. With only four exceptions-Brazil, Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Israel-we spoke only to ministers and LAs of Western countries.
This is due, in part, to the fact that Western officials were more willing
to participate in our study, and, in part, to financial restraints.6 Sec-
ond, we spoke with individuals from a variety of backgrounds, who
participated in the study with varying degrees of commitment and
preparation. Although they were all cooperative and forthcoming,
some of them may have exaggerated their roles or that of their agen-
cies, while others may have done the opposite out of modesty or skep-
ticism. Of course, when dealing with individuals, researchers must
ensure that the vagaries of personality do not intrude upon the ulti-
mate analysis. Most of the people with whom we spoke were admira-
bly candid and straightforward, and this warning is simply one which
the careful reader should consider regardless of whether we were care-
ful enough to apply it to ourselves.
I. LEGAL ADVISERS AND THE MINISTRIES THEY SERVE
The LAs we interviewed work primarily in the foreign ministries
of their respective countries. Although the structure of these offices
varies from nation to nation, the legal advisers' functions are strikingly
similar. I will begin by describing the LA's role before turning to vari-
ous factors that influence the LA's power to affect foreign policy
decisions.
A. The Role of the Legal Adviser
LAs play various roles within the confines of their foreign minis-
tries. According to our interviewees, these roles vary little from coun-
try to country. First of all, LAs must attend to the daily affairs of the
office. This includes handling all low-level crises, from the treatment
of foreign nationals to simply going through the masses of information
the office receives on a regular basis. Membership in international or-
ganizations often entails technical work for which the lawyer seems
uniquely qualified, such as drafting resolutions, commenting on draft
resolutions tabled by other States, or preparing responses to question-
naires and requests for legal information from the international organ-
6. The absence of Third World perspectives in this study should in no way be construed as
reflecting negatively on those countries.
Fall 1992]
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ization. Only Switzerland, which divides its office in two, keeps its
"legal counselor" away from these subjects.
Other LA tasks are less regular but equally traditional, such as the
drafting and negotiation of treaties. Here, legal acumen and training
are at a premium; some countries even prefer to have an entirely sepa-
rate office for this work. Regardless of the office responsible for the
actual conclusion of treaties, lawyers clearly take their direction from
others in that department. They do not enter negotiations with carte
blanche authority, but rather serve entirely as draftsmen. Further-
more, not every treaty signed merits the LA's attention. In France,
for instance, the LA looks at only a handful of the three or four hun-
dred treaties signed annually. 7 In Switzerland, where each ministry
must consult with all other ministries before taking proposals to the
cabinet, a system called "co-reporting," the LA may be asked by his
minister to review any treaty which might otherwise have gone with-
out the LA's analysis.
LAs also traditionally represent or advise their governments in in-
ternational litigation, although this role has spread to other govern-
ment ministries as regional organizations have become increasingly
influential in international affairs. Some regional bodies-notably the
European Community and the Council of Europe, with its European
Commission and Court of Human Rights-have become so en-
trenched that litigating issues involving such organizations has become
routine work for the lawyers of other ministries. For instance, cases
before the European Commission or Court of Human Rights often are
dealt with by lawyers from the justice ministries of a number of coun-
tries, including France, Switzerland, and Italy. Still, LAs remain in-
volved in litigating matters before other international courts, such as
the various arbitral courts or the International Court of Justice.
In no country surveyed was the LA's office responsible for dealing
with parliament, except indirectly as an adviser to a minister preparing
parliamentary proposals. In Italy, the LA may also be responsible for
drafting speeches on international law to be delivered by the minister.
Other countries seem to restrict the LA's speech-writing role to simple
consultation.
The LA's precise role becomes the most difficult to define when it
involves doing what the title requires: advise. In practice, it is impos-
sible to generalize about what an LA can do in this field. The scope of
the advisory role depends to a great extent on how much advice is
sought, and to a lesser extent on the LA's own initiative in offering
7. The other treaties are scrutinized by lawyers from other staffs.
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advice independently. At the same time, several of the LAs with
whom we spoke referred to the rapidity with which they are obliged to
transform themselves from objective expounders of law before an action
is taken by the president, the foreign minister, or the cabinet, to subjec-
tive advocates of their governments' positions after an action is taken
by the executive branch, sometimes contrary to the LA's suggestion.
As one LA put it, when acting as an objective expounder of the law,
LAs must give "an unvarnished objective opinion of what the legal
situation is." When they later must act as "advocates," LAs switch
hats and play the role of "barrister for the government." According to
a number of LAs, the major problem with the advocate role is that
often they are called in when the trouble has already started, whereas
they would much prefer to step in when the trouble still could be
avoided.
Even as "national advocates," however, LAs must act prudently
and must carefully consider the costs and benefits of interpreting rules
in the manner most beneficial to the national interest. For instance,
the United States has long resisted interpreting the self-defense provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter to allow anticipatory strikes, fear-
ing that the resulting definition would be so vague as to allow
unwarranted uses of force.8 Israel, on the other hand, has several
times justified actions such as their bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reac-
tor9 by interpreting the U.N. Charter exactly in the manner the United
States has tended to eschew.
According to our interviews, incidents that held the potential for
LA involvement tended to fall into three categories: (a) the LA was
immediately called in to give his advice, (b) the LA was kept out of the
decision-making process, or (c) the LA was only consulted after the
event to provide some justification for action already under way.
As an example of the first category, immediate LA involvement,
when the United States took forcible action against Libya in the
1980s, 10 the American LA was very much involved from the outset.
8. See Rosalyn Higgens, The Attitude of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of
Force, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442-44 (A. Cassese
ed. 1986).
9. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1635
(1984); see also Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of
the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, 510, 512,
515 (A. Cassese ed. 1986); Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 17, 24 (A. Cassese ed. 1986);
Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584
(1983).
10. See, eg., Steven R. Weisman, US. Bans Imports of Oil From Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1982, at Al, AI0; see President's Address to the Nation: United States Air Strike Against
Libya, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 491 (Apr. 14, 1986); see generally, Yehuda Z. Blum, The
Fall 1992]
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According to one interviewee, through this participation one could see
a rapid elimination of options for dealing with the situation. First
there were economic sanctions, then diplomatic representations, then
European sanctions, as well as expulsions of Libyans from European
countries. The bomb attack on the Berlin discotheque in 1986 was the
last straw.1 1 Having exhausted all peaceful means, the United States
decided to resort to military means.
American LAs have also played a role in *other areas. Thus, for
instance, when the United States decided to send troops to Grenada in
1983,12 a former LA told us he was involved from the outset and was
able to give important legal advice. Similarly, when the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice decided to freeze foreign assets in the course of law
enforcement over money-laundering operations, State Department
LAs suggested that in some cases there could be a problem with sover-
eign immunity and consequently advocated a cooperative, rather than
confrontational, approach. As a result, U.S. policy was changed and a
new procedure was adopted that required members of the LA's office
to sign all memoranda.
Other cases of early LA involvement have occurred in Hungary.
In 1989, nationals of the German Democratic Republic fled to the
Federal Republic of Germany through Hungary, abandoning hun-
dreds of cars. 13 The Hungarian LA was immediately asked to advise
whether these cars should be handed back to their owners or turned
over to East German authorities. He suggested that the first alterna-
tive was more in keeping with the law. In another case, Czechoslova-
kian youths hijacked a Hungarian plane, forcing it to land in the
Federal Republic of Germany.1 4 The same Hungarian LA was con-
sulted immediately about whether Hungary should request extradition
of the hijackers. He strongly suggested that it should, because this was
demanded by the U.N. Convention on Hijacking. 15 But policymakers
disregarded this advice and decided that political considerations re-
quired them to refrain from requesting extradition. So they left this
Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1986) (discussing the origins and background of
the U.S.-Libya dispute regarding the Gulf of Sidra).
11. President's Address to the Nation: United States Air Strike Against Libya, supra note 10,
at 492.
12. For a discussion of the United States' invasion of Grenada, see WILLIAM C. GILMORE,
THE GRENADA INTERVENTION (1984).
13. Hungary to Return Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1989, at A13.
14. [Two] Teen-Age Gunmen Hijack Hungarian Jetliner and Seek Asylum in Germany, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1989, at A10; see Hungarian Airliner Hijacked in Prague, UPI, Mar. 29, 1989,
available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
15. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
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option to Czechoslovakia instead. 6
Instances in which policymakers did not consult LAs apparently
include the United States' decision to send troops to the Dominican
Republic in 1965 during the Dominican revolution, 17 and U.S. Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter's attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran.'
Nor were lawyers consulted with regard to the Iran-Contra affair. 19
Apparently, France also failed to consult its LA before ordering the
sinking of the Rainbow Warrior,20 nor did it consult its LA before the
secret intelligence agents responsible for sinking the ship were re-
turned to France.2'
In the third category, various foreign ministries initially did not
consult the LA and then later had second thoughts. For instance, dur-
ing the Falkland (Malvinas) conflict,22 Irish authorities first went
along with the European Community decision 23 about trade sanctions
against Argentina. Subsequently, after consulting their LA, Irish offi-
cials concluded that these sanctions were contrary to the laws of neu-
trality and consequently discontinued them.
There are other cases when LAs, although not consulted before a
political decision was made, were nevertheless able to influence the
course of events by promptly stepping in on their own initiative. One
16. Ultimately, West German officials did not extradite the hijackers but brought them to
trial in West Germany. Czechoslovak Teens Get Probation in Jet Hijack, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30,
1989, at C12. (North Sports Final Ed.).
17. For a discussion of the United States' role in the Dominican revolution, see JEROME
SLATER, INTERVENTION AND NEGOTIATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); A.J. Thomas, Jr. and Ann Van Wynen Thomas, The Dominican Republic
Crisis 1965, THE NINTH HAMMARSKI6LD FORUM 1-36, May 2, 1966 (John Carey ed. 1967).
18. See Harold H. Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, November 1979--May 1980, in AMER-
ICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN 142-43 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed. 1985).
19. In the United States all matters involving covert activities or armed intervention are
subject to review by a senior interagency group composed of lawyers from the State Department,
the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.
All such combined legal efforts are conducted under the aegis of the National Security Council.
For a discussion of the Iran-Contra affair, see THEODORE DRAPER, A VERY THIN LINE:
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1991); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CON-
STITUTON: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
20. Richard Bernstein, France Concedes its Agents Sank Greenpeace Boat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1985, at Al; Richard Bernstein, Official Said to Have Ordered Ship 'Neutralized,' N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1985, at A4.
21. The French LA, however, was actively engaged in the defense of France in claims filed by
New Zealand as a result of the second incident. France Now Closes the Book on Affair Over
Greenpeace, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1986, at A4; Paul Lewis, [Two]French Agents in Ship's Bomb-
ing Will Be Released, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1986, at Al.
22. For a discussion of the Falkland (Malvinas) conflict, see ENRIQUE FERRER VIEYRA, AN
ANNOTATED LEGAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE MALVINAS (FALKLAND) ISLANDS CONTROVERSY
(English lang. ed. 1984); RAPHAEL PERL, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL 'LAW AND POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK (1983).
23. See Community Solidarity in the Falklands Conflict, 15 BULL. OF E.CoMM. no. 4, at
1.1.5, 1.1.7 (June 1982).
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LA from a relatively small country mentioned a case where he had
been able to prevent a major political decision which would have
amounted to a serious breach of international law. After the nation's
cabinet, without any prior consultation with the LA, decided to de-
nounce a major international treaty, the LA was able to persuade the
prime minister that such a step, in addition to being politically unwise,
was contrary to international law and would not produce the legal
effects sought. In that LA's opinion, it was the latter argument that
convinced the prime minister, who became aware that the denuncia-
tion would not have been effective to release the State from its legal
obligations in a short span of time, and would have had serious reper-
cussions on public opinion.
There also are cases when the LA was not consulted simply be-
cause the authorities who made the decision did not have time for such
consultation. Thus, during the Falkland (Malvinas) conflict, the sink-
ing of the Argentinean ship Belgrano by the British Navy 24 was de-
cided by the highest authorities in charge of the conflict and not
cleared with the LA. However, the LA previously had been consulted
on the rules of engagement for the British army and navy.
Finally, there are instances in which LAs were asked after the fact
to provide some sort of justification for the action in question. In the
Entebbe case, the advice of Israeli LAs was sought only after the Is-
raeli planes had taken off for Uganda.25 The planning stages of the
raid were so shrouded in secrecy that no legal opinion was requested.
But after the planes had left, although the issue was still acute, LAs
were called in under orders not to communicate with the outside
world. Similarly, American LAs were not consulted when U.S. offi-
cials decided to withhold U.S. funds from the United Nations.26
When they were called in for advice, the LAs responded with the justi-
fication that the United Nations had exceeded its authority with re-
gard to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 27 Nor were U.S.
State Department LAs asked for advice before certain announcements
24. Edward Schumacker, Argentina Confirms Loss of its Cruiser: Says 123 of 1,042 on Board
Have Been Saved, N.Y. TIMEs, May 4, 1982, at Al; see Edward Schumacher, Argentina Cruiser
Damaged in British Submarine Attack Outside Falkland War Zone, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1982, at
Al; R.W. Apple, London Reports New Clash at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1982, at Al.
25. See generally, Leslie C. Greer, Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects, ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM.
R. 312 (1976) (discussing legal implications of the rescue at Entebbe).
26. See Bernard D. Nossitter, U.S. Will Not Pay a U.N. Assessment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1982, at AI; see also Bernard D. Nossitter, U.N. Chief Chides U.S. on Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1983, at A4.
27. According to U.S. officials, the United Nations had exceeded its authority because, inter
alia, it had granted the PLO observer status. Bernard D. Nossitter, U.S. Will Not Pay a U.N.
Assessment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1982, at Al.
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were made on the question of extraterritorial action for law enforce-
ment, the so-called rendition. Once consulted, the LAs tried to high-
light the international law problems that would be raised and the legal
consequences this would have for prosecutors.2 8
B. Institutional Factors Affecting the Legal Advisers' Efficacy
While LAs we interviewed all had similar tasks within their re-
spective governments, the institutional structure of their offices varied
greatly from country to country, which in turn influenced their effec-
tiveness. Each of the present and former LAs we interviewed took
great care to emphasize the role his office played in relation to the
work of the foreign ministry in particular, and also to the govern-
ment's overall structure. It became obvious that the institutional
structure of the LA's office played a significant part in the effectiveness
of the LA's advice as well as the very existence of that advice.
In the United States, for example, the LA has a rank equivalent to
that of an assistant secretary. This places him midway through a de-
partmental structure which includes the secretary of state, a deputy
secretary, several under-secretaries, and about twenty fellow assistant
secretaries. The LA's office is itself divided into sections which serve
the various bureaus of the department. 29 Although each lawyer is part
of the LA's office instead of a particular bureau, each lawyer will sit.on
the concerned assistant secretary's principal staff and also on the bu-
reau directorate. The lawyer's presence at staff meetings is the main
wellspring of the job's opportunities. 30 As Professor Macdonald
28. For a discussion on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law enforcement and extradition
policies, see Oversight Hearing on the Authority of the FBI to Seize Suspects Abroad, before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 8, 1989) (statements of William P. Barr,
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of State; Oliver B. Revell, Associate Deputy Direct-
Investigations, FBI; Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State) (on file with the
Michigan Journal ofInternational Law); Press Remarks by James A. Baker III, Oct. 13, 1989 (on
file with the Michigan Journal of International Law). See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law En-
forcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83 Am. J. INr'L L. 880 (1989); An-
dreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law,
Continued, 84 Am. J. Ir'rL L. 444 (1990); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992) (holding that a government-sponsored abduction of a criminal defendant in violation
of extradition treaties will not place that defendant outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts).
29. The U.S. State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser consists of approximately 100
attorneys and a similar number of support staff. Its organization corresponds closely to the State
Department's overall bureaucratic structure. The office has five offices organized according to
world regions, each with an assistant LA and an attorney, and fourteen functional offices-in
such areas as consular affairs, economics, btlsiness, communication, human rights, refugees, law
enforcement, and intelligence-which may have up to three attorneys, in addition to an assistant
LA. The nineteen assistant LAs report directly to the LA by way of weekly written reports. The
assistant LAs also attend a weekly staff meeting, which is presided over by one of the deputy
LAs. The LA spends much of his time traveling and would normally not attend those meetings.
30. LAs refer to these bureaus as their "clients."
Fall 1992]
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points out, in the U.S. State Department
the lawyers and the policy officers work together; and this enables the
lawyers to call attehtion to legal problems as they arise in operation.
The lawyers thus perform an active and creative role, rather than a pas-
sive or 'waiting-to-be-consulted' role.31
While the United States provides an exemplary model, the United
Kingdom's system is also important. In many respects it is similar to
the U.S. model but proves perhaps less effective on account of the lim-
ited staff of the Office of the LA.
The cornerstone of the British system is the care taken to integrate
legal advisers into the departments they serve. The Foreign Ministry
employs twenty-six legal advisers, only twenty of whom serve in
London.3 2 All of the advisers are fully qualified to practice law, either
as barristers or solicitors. 33
The ministry itself has approximately seventy departments. Some
are geographical, such as South American or Western Europe, and
some are functional, such as the protocol department. These depart-
ments are similar to the bureaus at the U.S. State Department. Each
has its own legal adviser, to whom it turns when in need of legal ad-
vice. With only twenty advisers, then, each lawyer is necessarily at-
tached to more than one department. Some departments are also split
for purposes of legal advice. The South American department, for in-
stance, includes Antarctica, but Antarctica raises certain problems34
which fall under the purview of other departments.
Under the British system, each department has the responsibility
of deciding whether to take international legal problems to that de-
partment's legal adviser. Guidelines demand that certain problems,
such as international claims, must be taken for review. The depart-
31. See Ronald St. John Macdonald, The Role of the Legal Adviser of Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, 156 RECUEIL DES COuRS D'ACADfMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE [hereafter
R.C.A.D.I.] 377, 451 (1977-III).
32. The United Kingdom takes the somewhat exceptional step of posting the rest of its legal
advisers abroad.
33. The British LAs are recruited by competition organized by the Civil Service Commission.
Rarely are more than one or two hired at once, because given the small size of the permanent
staff, a greater number of new staffers is neither necessary nor manageable. Successful recruits
occasionally come from private practice, from public international organizations, or from univer-
sity teaching staffs; thus a mix of practical and academic experience exists among the ranks.
Upon joining the service, the new recruits become full time legal advisers. If posted abroad, they
are sent as LAs and not as career diplomats. Only rarely does an LA transfer to the main
diplomatic service.
34. The special issues surrounding Antarctica go beyond its remote geography. For instance,
Antarctic policy is tempered by claims of sovereignty, the implementation of The Antarctic
Treaty (Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71), and the application of the U.N. Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1 Ith Sess., U.N.Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea].
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ment, however, usually uses its discretion. In practice, opinions are
sought more often than might be strictly necessary. Department
heads' training and experience provides them with a healthy respect
for matters of law. Accountability is built into the system; department
heads know their work will be questioned further along in the chain of
command if the consequences of their proposals are unclear. The
chief LA ranks as a department head and attends the daily meetings of
all the department heads. 35
In Switzerland, the LA's office is divided by function. One section,
headed by an ambassador with the title of "Director of the Foreign
Department's Office for Legal Affairs," assumes the responsibility of
overseeing regular issues that arise daily. In addition to the LA, a
leading academic, known as a "jurisconsult" or "legal counselor," also
assumes a trouble-shooting role within the ministry and is also
charged with planning and outlining the international legal policy of
the State. The Swiss LA we interviewed believes that such an organi-
zational structure allows his country to develop general principled po-
sitions on significant long-range issues without sacrificing practicality
and efficiency. The Swiss LA plays a significant role in the policy-
making process by meeting with the foreign minister and other depart-
ment heads the day before the weekly Swiss cabinet meetings. Of
course, this enhanced role is facilitated by the size of the Swiss Foreign
Department and the fact that Switzerland is a neutral State. The fact
that Switzerland is not a member of the United Nations might also aid
in this enhanced role-perhaps there are fewer multilateral matters to
discuss.
Not all LAs are as fortunate to be so integrated into the policy-
making process. Countries with small legal staffs often relegate them
to more purely bureaucratic roles. But even in those countries some
notion of law's importance often remains. In Hungary, for instance,
the LA sits on the ministry's crisis staff, and is immediately notified
when an urgent situation exists.
Other patterns exist elsewhere for reasons of expediency and phi-
losophy. In the Netherlands, for example, the adviser's office exists
side-by-side with other specialized legal units, such as the treaties de-
partment, and several legal affairs sections with varying responsibili-
ties. The lawyers in those departments may consult with the LA, but
the LA's office itself does not oversee the entire ministry's legal busi-
35. See Arthur D. Watts, International Law and International Relations United Kingdom
Practice, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 157 (1991).
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ness like the LA's office does in the United Kingdom and the United
States.
In other countries too-Hungary, Ireland, and Italy-the LA as-
sumes the role of a generalist and is unable to systematically oversee
the entire foreign affairs operation because of staffing limitations. In
these countries, unlike such countries as the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Bulgaria, the LA normally lacks independent
access to the ministry's cable traffic-cables sent to the ministry by the
country's embassies and permanent missions to international organiza-
tions-and must rely wholly on referrals. 36 An Hungarian LA said
that while this might weaken his position, it was also inevitable, be-
cause the task of sorting through that information would overwhelm
his office. His fears may be well founded. A former French LA
claimed to have spent two hours each day sifting through cables to
find legal issues. Countries with smaller legal staffs, such as Ireland
and Italy, are also more likely than other countries to ask outside law-
yers for advice; the lawyers consulted may be either practicing attor-
neys or academics.
The mechanics of a given country's bureaucracy also play a role in
whether international law is included in policy formulation. In some
countries, lawyers face tremendous obstacles in independently raising
unsolicited legal considerations, or in pursuing the implementation of
recommendations they have given.
Be that as it may, it should be noted that in all of the countries we
surveyed, the possible input of international law primarily takes place
at the bureaucratic level rather than at the cabinet or other policy-
making level. Admittedly, the national constitutions of some coun-
tries-such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and Italy37 -refer, explicitly
or implicitly, to the recognition of international legal principles as a
broad policy goal, thereby requiring policymakers to take account of
the major guidelines on foreign policy deriving from international law.
Nevertheless, even in these countries bureaucratic input sometimes
proves necessary in the consideration of legal matters, such as when a
treaty or other international obligation directly conflicts with a stated
national interest. In these cases, the pressure to renounce or evade
that obligation becomes formidable, and policymakers prefer to turn
to legal advisers to get some sort of support for their attempt to cir-
cumvent international legal rules.
36. In Italy's case, however, the Office of the LA receives some general cables directly, in
addition to receiving cables and dispatches sifted through a central office in Rome.
37. IR. CONST. art. 29, § 3; GRONDWET [Constitution of the Kingdom][GRw. NED.] art. 90
(Neth.); CosTrruzIONE [Constitution] [CosT.] art. 10 (Italy).
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,C. Other Factors Influencing the Legal Advisers' Ability to
Participate in Foreign Policy
In addition to the structural considerations, our interviews estab-
lished that a number of factors must be considered in evaluating the
impact of LAs' advice on foreign policy: (a) the manner and fre-
quency with which the LA can offer his advice to policy-makers;
(b) the LA's individual personality; (c) the LA's training and back-
ground; (d) the amount of experience the LA has had with an issue as
compared with the experience of the diplomats involved; and
(e) constraints limiting the LA's role.
It is important to note that availability of advice is directly related
to the availability of a convenient forum to communicate advice. In
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Bul-
garia, the LA is able to offer advice through his participation in regu-
lar staff meetings, whereas his counterparts in other countries, such as
Italy, lack the opportunity to express opinions due to the infrequency
and irregularity of those meetings.
Institutional structures that give LAs access to regular staff meet-
ings also enable them to translate. their experience into personal au-
thority. One of our British interviewees compared the role of the LA
with that of a traditional "family solicitor," in that the LA assumes
the authority to discuss a wide range of issues in a variety of contexts
without limiting himself to legal matters. Thus, institutional authority
in the U.K. system is often less important than personal authority, and
the advice given by an LA acting under the latter may not be strictly
legal in nature. Because, under normal circumstances, the British LA
must wait for the department head to ask advice on any given mat-
ter-which may not even occur-the lawyer must always be willing to
press his views when the opportunity arises. Conversely, one of our
U.S. interviewees mentioned the U.S. style of open, freewheeling meet-
ings, where the lawyer can express his views on whatever topic is being
discussed by the regional or functional bureau that he serves.
The importance of a given LA's interpersonal skills varies from
country to country, often according to the differing amount of access
to higher authority that LAs enjoy in different countries. Under the
U.S. model, the force of the LA's personality can win the confidence of
the secretary of state and circumvent the usual chain of command to
gain access to a key decisionmaker.38 Both the British and American
LAs must use their charisma to diminish their superiors' and col-
38. It should noted that in the United States, the LA is appointed by the president and is
likely to be in the confidence of the secretary of state, who is also a presidential appointee.
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leagues' resistance to seeking legal opinions. As one former American
LA noted: "Whether you are invited to the Ball, so to speak, is very
important." He explained that the more one is seen with one's secre-
tary of state, the more one is likely to be "included in the Ball." How-
ever invitations are limited: the "Cinderellas" are in the regional
departments, such as Europe and Africa, while the ugly stepsisters
come from the functional departments, such as economic affairs,
ocean, environment, and so forth. "And if you're the lawyer," he said,
"of course you tend to be the ugliest [step]sister of all because you are
the lawyer."
Education and background can also play a pivotal role in the effec-
tiveness of an LA. In France, for example, university professors al-
ways occupied the position of LA until World War II. Since then,
"administrative judges" have been preferred for the post; the last two
have been members of the Conseil d'Etat. Other members of the LA's
staff are diplomats, except for the Deputy LA who comes from the
judiciary. It is noteworthy that the top position is reserved for judges,
who are perhaps more likely to respect and follow law than diplomats.
Furthermore, the composition of political organs may determine the
LAs' influence. The number of lawyers in the cabinet itself, as well as
throughout the government, may affect the reception given to legal
advice.
The considerable length of an LA's involvement in some matters
also makes the role unique: LAs often have the benefit of serving in
the same position for many years, while diplomatic personnel are reas-
signed more frequently. As a result, LAs are often better informed
about a particular issue than those in the department who are respon-
sible for it. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the same two depart-
mental LAs dealt with Rhodesia3 9 between 1964 and 1972, while three
heads of one department, and four of the other served during the same
period. As other staff members pursue careers as diplomats, moving
from department to department and from country to country, these
"action officers," as they are known in the United States, are inevita-
bly less experienced in several fields than even junior LAs. The desire
to get credit and promotion can lead to an unconscious, or even con-
scious, rivalry between diplomats and LAs. Lawyers' participation in
meetings sometimes leads to translating the issue into legal jargon,
thus allowing the lawyers to outshine the diplomatic staff and steal the
show. Thus, policymakers in fields such as arms-control negotiation
39. For a discussion of the United Kingdom's policies toward Rhodesia, see PRIME MINIS-
TER'S DEPT., RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RHODESIA GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED KING-
DOM GOVERNMENT (1966).
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have complained that the lawyers have taken over. Not only is this
perceived as legal grandstanding, but some policymakers also worry
that the lawyers' penchant for clinching deals and contracts might
cause them to overlook some of the concessions they make.
The institutional strength of the LA is mixed. A British LA em-
phasized that an LA may find little use for institutional authority per-
ceived as rooted in a previous administration or as reluctant to
incorporate new approaches to legal problems. Other department offi-
cials may attempt to exclude legal advisers from policy formulation
and revision if the LA's office is perceived as firmly entrenched in the
bureaucracy and unable to offer much more than almost uniformly
conservative opinions. The LA pointed out that the department must
be especially careful "when traditional advice [becomes worn out]
around the edges."
The ability to offer advice carries distinct advantages over having
to wait for it to be requested, as the nature of the requests themselves
may constitute constraints on the lawyers in various ways. First, be-
cause foreign affairs are part of the political process, many decisions
are made in light of political motivations and other pressures, and the
LA is neither authorized nor qualified to reach such decisions in the
political arena. Obviously, when the prime minister or president for-
mulates a policy which even the foreign minister or secretary of state
must accept as a fait accompli, the LA is powerless to influence it in
any way. Even when the initiative for a new policy comes exclusively
from the foreign minister, political expediency often may exclude the
LA from its formulation. However, such policies could create new
opportunities for LAs if they were asked to help apply and interpret
the policies, even if they were not consulted in determining their
content.
Many situations in international affairs require quick decision-
making at a high level, and the LA's input in such situations is neces-
sarily diminished. Although the LA's advice on possible courses of
action may actually be sought in such cases, an LA generally is unable
to offer a detailed legal analysis in such situations due to time con-
straints. Instead, the LA will offer advice more cautionary than legal,
based on the adviser's knowledge of similar situations. In such cases,
the previously mentioned melding of personal and institutional au-
thority is more likely to result in confusion caused by disparate opin-
ions than in effective collaboration between departments.
Generalizations on the extent to which the LA's advice is heeded
can be dangerous. Thus, there are cases in which the LA, the minis-
try, and the head of the executive branch must deal with actions under
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fire-both literally and figuratively-by officers in the field. When de-
cisions are made in distant locations by people outside of the supervi-
sion of the LA's office, there is obviously little superiors can do to
influence them. The LA prepares for such situations in advance by
providing field officers with a set of guidelines on which they may rely.
Rules of engagement during wartime are the most common, and per-
haps the most important, example of such contingency planning, as
noted by a British LA in reference to the United States' attacks on
Libyan aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea4°-an action taken in the
field, but envisioned years earlier around a conference table.
II. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Legal Characteristics Promoting Compliance
According to most LAs, it is difficult to breach clear, fundamental,
and prohibitive rules, even in extreme and unusual situations. For in-
stance, when the U.S. government was considering potential resolu-
tions to the Cuban Missile Crisis,41 the wholesale destruction of the
island was ruled out as not only a violation of international law but
also contrary to commonly held notions of morality. This is not to
suggest that mere legality renders a particular course of action moral.
Far more often, legal arguments weigh heavily not on the side of mo-
rality, but rather on the side of prudence. Thus, it would have been
imprudent in that situation - to say the least - for the United States
to have reacted with unparalleled force to an unknown threat.
Legal judgments can result from an emphasis on prudence, often at
the expense of morally sound solutions. For instance, countries are far
less likely to protest the violation of international law by a superpower
than by a smaller country over which they exert some degree of au-
thority. A country is unlikely to oppose the human rights practices of
another country when it knows its efforts will not serve to remedy the
abuses and may in fact aggravate an existing situation, as in the case of
the Swiss refusal to sanction South Africa over that nation's apartheid
policies.42
The presence of legal analysis in a political issue serves to diminish
40. See generally, Blum, supra note 10 (discussing the origins and background of the U.S.-
Libya dispute regarding the Gulf of Sidra).
41. See CHAYES, supra note 2.
42. According to our interviewees, Switzerland has long refused to follow any of the sanc-
tions recommended or imposed by the United Nations regarding South Africa. See generally,
COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, SOUTH AF-
RICA: THE SANCTIONS REPORT 44, 75, 78 (1989) (mentioning Switzerland's trade practices with
South Africa during the 1980s).
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the intensity of debate at all levels and discourages countries from re-
acting to political crises in a violent and ineffective manner. It is un-
clear whether law or prudence more strongly influences the tendency
toward moderation in the resolution of international conflict, but the
two are inevitably connected. When prudence is argued, it is always
advocated in legal terms, often by lawyers themselves. It hardly mat-
ters whether law is prudence disguised or prudence incarnated; it is
used as the guarantor of prudence, and is accepted as such.
The need to maintain consistency and to avoid retaliation-objec-
tives touted by lawyers and diplomats as central to their respective
missions-further encourages moderation. First, both lawyers and
diplomats strive to ensure a consistent approach toward international
issues by their governments. The French LA emphasized that pro-
moting consistency was one of his major tasks and implied that it is a
role for which lawyers are uniquely suited. International law provides
objective guidelines against which individual countries can measure
the success of their responses to various crises and thereby ensure that
their responses are foreseeable to others. Second, States fear retalia-
tion or reprisals in future dealings with other States if they fail to ad-
here to international guidelines. In other words, States fear the tu
quoque, or reciprocity, principle. Every time a State elects to ignore or
reinterpret an existing international standard according to its own in-
terests, it runs the risk of being unable to invoke the rule in the future,
and indeed, if a State acquires a long-term reputation of non-compli-
ance, it may forfeit the protection of international law entirely.
The clarity with which a given international legal standard has
been articulated also will affect the degree to which that standard in-
fluences the LA's foreign policy advice. LAs repeatedly stressed that
whether or not law can play a role as a guiding factor in foreign poli-
cymaking turns on whether the legal standards are clear and undis-
puted, or are instead vague and lacking in authority. As one Deputy
LA put it, the factors that LAs usually take into account when giving
advice include: the extent to which the relevant rules of international
law are clear and well-established; the extent to which international
law is reflected in domestic law; and the extent to which national inter-
ests are affected.
International law's significance is thus diminished by its fluidity
and tenuous binding authority. Various LAs, including the Hun-
garian LA we interviewed, pointed out that customary law is more
likely to be regarded with suspicion than treaty law because customary
law is unwritten. By contrast, the law can play a pivotal role in a
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government's decision when it is clear and serves to advance the gov-
ernment's position.
Despite these generalities, however, many LAs pointed out that
one cannot make a sweeping appraisal of international law by gauging
the extent to which policymakers abide by it. In their view, a distinc-
tion should be drawn between various segments of international law,
some of which lend themselves more easily to government compliance.
These LAs emphasized that while States tend to respect both organi-
zational legal standards-rules governing international organizations
or international procedures, for example-and rules based on reci-
procity, States are much less likely to live up to international norms
based on other mechanisms. It is therefore appropriate to dwell briefly
on these various categories of international legal standards.
1. International Law as a Framework
Many LAs insisted that international law exists primarily to pre-
serve institutional frameworks that have developed over time and have
been adopted voluntarily by States. Such frameworks can be based
either on matters of custom, such as the rules of war or diplomacy, or
exclusively on treaties, such as those authorizing international organi-
zations. Most States greatly respect the institutional structure found
in international law, and small States in particular rely tremendously
on the predictability and safeguards it provides. Of the countries in
our survey, Ireland, Italy, and Switzerland placed the most emphasis
on the value of general standards and safeguards. Switzerland, in fact,
acknowledges its special relationship with customary international
law, which provides the basis for its status as a permanently neutral
country. Like all small States, Switzerland also relies on the frame-
work of international regulations to safeguard its economic relations
with other States and to provide most of the limited influence it pos-
sesses in dealing with larger States. All States carefully consider the
advantages and disadvantages of regularization and conformity, but
small States generally have little flexibility in deciding whether to con-
form to international legal standards because of their relative lack of
power.
Larger States, whether they are superpowers or countries with
other extraterritorial concerns, 43 tend to regard their commitments
under general rules of international law more as a matter of policy
than of necessity.44 However, larger States may fear that ignoring in-
43. The United Kingdom is one example.
44. For an example of the role of international law in U.S. jurisprudence, see United States v.
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ternational guidelines in a particular instance may cause other coun-
tries to treat them in the same arbitrary fashion in future dealings. By
and large, the application of such cost-benefit analyses almost univer-
sally results in States honoring their obligations in the face of minor
and often disagreeable consequences.
According to most LAs, international law's function as a frame-
work for peaceful cooperation is simply too important to ignore.
However, it should not be forgotten that the authority accorded to a
particular set of legal standards is directly related to the importance
and utility of the legal subject to which the laws apply.
2. Reciprocity as a Guarantor of International Law
All of the LAs interviewed stressed that in many areas governed by
international legal standards, States rely on the reciprocity principle to
ensure compliance. For example, a particular country enacted legisla-
tion forbidding the spouses of embassy employees posted in the coun-
try to work. The United States responded by revoking the privilege
for spouses of that country's embassy employees in the United States.
The country subsequently bowed to pressure from its embassy employ-
ees and changed its laws.
In such instances, reciprocity is a valuable tool applied by States to
ensure compliance with international law and to bring about changes
which are perceived to be essential. In a more general sense, States are
cognizant of the fact that they must treat other countries fairly to en-
sure similar treatment for themselves.
3. Law Outside of the Reciprocity Principle: The Protection of
Human Rights
LAs from such countries as the United States, France, Italy, and
the United Kingdom emphasized that their government authorities
would not even consider mistreating a foreign national in retaliation
for similar treatment of one of their own citizens. 45 However, while
the goal of protecting human rights is universally recognized, few
States are willing to commit themselves in actual practice to guaran-
teeing humane treatment outside their national borders. Small States,
in particular, are reluctant to protest against human rights abuses by
other countries. LAs from Ireland and Hungary, for instance, noted
that they rarely encourage their governments to oppose such viola-
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2194-96, 2200-05 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J. for the majority;
Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Of course, the same attitude can be expected from most countries.
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tions because doing so would be politically imprudent. A former
Dutch LA said that the Foreign Minister would be "highly as-
tounded" if an LA were to bring human rights violations abroad to his
attention. LAs from the United States and the United Kingdom sug-
gested that a foreign policy initiative on human rights formulated by
their offices would be taken more seriously if it were issued in the form
of an opinion regarding countries' legal obligations in the area of
human rights. For example, lawyers will bring to the attention of
their governments the fact that failure to react in some way to human
rights violations by another country could imply that they condone
the action or deem it permissible under international law. When par-
ticular events compel countries to protest, they generally do so directly
to the government involved through diplomatic channels rather than
through the public arena. This mechanism is used in order to preserve
an image of international cooperation.
States may also use international law to justify their silence in the
face of human rights violations. Switzerland, for instance, has long
refused to impose sanctions against South Africa for that country's
policy of apartheid, and has relied on its status as a permanently neu-
tral State to defend its "acceptance" of South African policy. 46
B. Legal Advisers' Contributions to International Law's Evolution
In addition to advising policymakers to conform with international
law, LAs frequently play leading roles in promoting the evolution of
international law in the direction they consider best suited to national
interests. For instance, it was the French LA who decided at the 1969
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties that France should oppose
the new concept of 'ius cogens" on account of its vagueness and the
"dangerous" implications it would therefore have.47 France's with-
drawal of its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
46. See supra note 42 and the accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of the concept ofjus cogens, see Eduardo Jiminez de Arfehaga, Interna-
tional Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 63-67 (1978-I).
The international community recognizes certain principles which safeguard values of vital
importance for humanity and correspond to fundamental moral principles: [T]hese princi-
ples are of concern to all States and "protect interests which are not limited to a particular
State or group of States, but belong to the community as a whole[."] They include the
prohibition of the use or threat of force and of aggression, the prevention and repression of
genocide, piracy, slave-trade, racial discrimination, terrorism or the taking of hostages. The
observance of these principles, firmly rooted in the legal conviction of the community of
States, is required from all members of that community and their violation by any State is
resented by all.
Id. at 64-65 (footnote omitted).
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tional Court of Justice,48 occasioned by that Court's decision in
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),4 9 also came at the suggestion of
the LA. Similarly, some members of the U.S. Office of the Legal Ad-
viser stated that it would be in the United States' interest to promote
international law's acceptance of the use of force to combat terrorism,
as well as some changes in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea,50 so that the United States would not later need to object that
those practices went beyond current legal standards.
American LAs have taken the lead in promoting the evolution in
international norms along these lines. An American LA pointed out
that in the development of international law, LAs in the United States
look to the cases they have solved and then extrapolate principles from
them, while Europeans tend to accept a principle and then work back-
ward. This difference in approaches to problem-solving-probably
connected to different legal perceptions stemming from common-law
and civil law traditions-can, in the opinion of one LA, be discerned
by examining the differences in U.S. and European attitudes toward
the "common heritage of mankind" principle.51 To the United States,
the "common heritage of mankind" notion is too loose and general to
be workable; its lack of specificity renders the concept legally inoper-
able. By contrast, most European nations regard the "common heri-
tage of mankind" as a general guideline subject to further legal
developments. In other words, European officials believe the concept
can provide at least a very broad behavior standard appropriate for
implementation through legal rules designed to make it workable in
interstate relations.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FOREIGN
POLICY
Before moving on to consider whether there are means available
48. Edward McWhinney, International Law-Making and the Judicial Process: The World
Court and the French Nuclear Tests Case, 3 SYRACUSE J. IThr'L L. & CoM. 9, 43 (1975).
49. 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20, 1974).
50. 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 34.
51. The "common heritage of mankind" principle outlines a non-traditional manner for dis-
tributing wealth in the international community. Traditionally, assets such as territory could
either be appropriated by sovereign states, subject to certain conditions, or were available for the
use by all states qua res commis omnium, things common to everyone. The principle of res
commis omnium was applied, for example, to the high seas with the consequences that rich
countries were able to draw greater benefits from the seas. With the introduction of the "com-
mon heritage of mankind," resources from the sea-bed, ocean floor, and subsoil are beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. Instead, such resources, as well as those from the moon, the sun,
and other celestial bodies "are vested in mankind as a whole." See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 376-92 (1986).
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for enhancing States' compliance with international legal standards, it
may be useful to briefly summarize the main results of our inquiry.
a None of the officials interviewed admitted to ever deciding or
suggesting blatant breaches of international law, although one former
attorney general conceded that because of crucial national interests,
his country had run up against international law in such areas as ex-
tradition, the continental shelf, and fishing rights. To be sure, the in-
terviewees' pro-international law stance is attributable to some extent
to their desire to avoid criticism over possible failures to fulfill their
national duties as law-abiding officials. Furthermore, States tend to
avoid openly admitting they have breached international law, prefer-
ring instead to cloak their transgressions "in the false colors of existing
right," a tendency aptly discussed by Professor Mendelson. 52
Still, the general tendency of States to abide by international legal
standards may be rooted in the fact that many politicians perceive in-
ternational law as a body of guidelines intended for the most part to
protect the interests of all States. As a former foreign minister noted
in an interview, "International law is a distillation of things that civi-
lized nations have agreed should be the basis of common action."
D Predictably, policymakers from small countries routinely pro-
fessed the greatest respect for international law, whereas those from
larger countries appeared inclined to question its value in some areas.
On the other hand, many small or medium-sized countries do not rely
on lawyers when decisions are made in foreign affairs, while most large
countries tend to effectively integrate legal staffs into their foreign min-
istries. This apparent paradox can be explained by two facts: (a) the
52. See Maurice H. Mendelson, Practice, Propaganda and Principle in International Law, in
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1989 at 8-9 (1990). Among the possible reasons for this tendency,
he cites:
First, on the domestic plane the state and its legal system are in a sense, as Kelsen has said,
synonymous; and certainly the legitimacy and authority of the government depends (at least
in part) on its obeying its own law; this being so, it is not a very attractive posture for it
openly to admit to delinquency on the international plane. Secondly, governments often
need domestic political support for their international activities and adventures; to admit
that you are engaged in aggression, for instance, is likely to arouse less enthusiasm amongst
the populace than claiming you are going to war to defend the motherland. Thirdly, if the
other government is minded to accept your claim, whether because it recognises the need for
a new rule (as with the acceptance of the Truman proclamation on the continental shelf) or
because it succumbs to political, economic or even military pressure, it will find it more face-
saving, and therefore easier, to acquiesce in something which is being presented as an ex-
isting right, rather than a novel demand. A connected point is that, if you can present your
demand as an existing right, it is the other government who would ostensibly be disturbing
the status quo by denying it, and not you by making the demand. Finally, there is always
the possibility that, even if the other state's government is not taken in by your claim, influ-
ential groups within that state or in politically significant third states, will be persuaded. In
other words, legal argument can be deployed as a form of propaganda. It is certainly
cheaper than war: to adapt La Rochefoucauld's maxim, hypocrisy is an inexpensive tribute
which vice pays to virtue.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis original).
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ultimate decision to apply or disregard international law is normally
made at the policy level while, as noted previously, lawyers primarily
operate at the bureaucratic level, and the participation of lawyers in
the decision-making process in large countries stops short of the last
echelons where policy issues are ultimately decided; and (b) policy-
makers in small and medium-sized countries favor following interna-
tional law as much as possible, because this approach tends to protect
their interests, ensure their credibility, and avoid reciprocal violations
of international law by other states. Thus, it can be said that the
amount of recognition granted to a country's LA bears little relation
to whether that country perceives the value of international law.
e Most LAs, whether from large or small countries, conceded-
as an abstract eventuality-that in conflicts between paramount na-
tional interests and international legal standards, the former are likely
to prevail.
* Furthermore, some of them admitted that in areas where inter-
national law is unclear or open to differing interpretations, States natu-
rally prefer the interpretation more consonant with national interests.
0 Some LAs argued that whenever they were consulted at an
early stage of the decision-making process and had a chance to offer a
choice between various alternatives, they always advocated the alter-
native leading to compliance with international law. 53
o At least one former foreign minister argued at great length that
in spite of his lack of international legal background and his tendency
to avoid consulting with his LAs, he always had made de facto deci-
sions conforming to international legal standards. He attributed this
primarily to the fact that he had tried to draw inspiration from his
national constitution, which upholds international law and even pro-
motes its respect. The foreign minister also contended that his deci-
sions had been based on common sense and restraint-values which,
on reflection, he thought were enshrined in international law.
So much for the principal results of our interviews. This general
picture may seem too rosy. One should not forget that most interview-
ees expressly or implicitly admitted that there is an "institutional"
possibility that international law will be breached despite contrary ad-
vice from the LA. This is possible for two reasons. First, LAs are not
always consulted by policymakers at an early stage of the decision-
making process, and in some cases are not consulted at all. It follows
that the existence of the LA's office does not by itself bar deliberate
53. This proposition, again, should be taken with a pinch of salt, in view of the interviewees'
personal and professional status.
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violations of international legal standards. Second, after politicians
have made their decisions with or without LA input, when the LA is
later requested to step in, his action normally will not lead to a repeal
of the wrong decision, even if he feels the decision was made contrary
to international law. This is because LAs feel that they should act as
"advocates" of the State once a decision is made. As a consequence, at
this stage LAs will uphold and defend the decision made by policy-
makers, even if it is at odds with international law.
Hence, even if no former foreign minister or former or present LA
has admitted to breaching international legal standards, the fact re-
mains that the institutional conditions exist in every country for
breaches of international law to occur, whatever the advice, if any, of
the LAs.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS
It would be obvious to suggest that if countries would only pay
more attention to their lawyers the role of international law would be
strengthened. Such a solution is too simplistic. Our inquiry has im-
plied that the relationship between the role of lawyers and the law
which the governments espouse is somewhat tenuous at best-at least
in some highly sensitive areas of foreign policy.
I would submit there are two main approaches to increasing the
impact of international legal standards on foreign policymaking.
First, legal standards could be strengthened to better ensure compli-
ance. This is a long-term objective, to be pursued jointly by more than
one State. Second, each State could better integrate its legal staff into
the decision-making process, a short-term objective to be pursued by
States individually. This second approach could enhance the impact
of international law on foreign policy, except for areas where other
considerations-military, economic, or political-take precedence in
the eyes of policymakers.
A. Improving International Law to Ensure Compliance
1. Strengthening the Role of International Regional Organizations
One of the best means of promoting respect for international
norms involves expanding the number of regional and interregional
compacts as well as enhancing the role of those that already exist.
Many LAs reported that action in conformity with international legal
standards was brought about by the need to take account of regional
or interregional organizations and their pronouncements.
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The European Community (EC) is often considered a prime exam-
ple of a successful regional organization. European lawyers participat-
ing in our study highlighted the fact that the EC provided not only
cohesion among Member States, but also a double layer of interna-
tional law, thereby making it more difficult for States to ignore EC
dictates. But the fact that EC law is directly binding on national au-
thorities and is carried out by specific institutional enforcement mech-
anisms distinguishes it from other types of international law. In fact,
LAs play an increasingly less significant role in its implementation as
EC law becomes directly applicable to the relevant ministries. Similar
organizations would not be feasible in many geographic areas because
of a lack of resources required for the successful functioning of a mul-
tinational organization-as in the Andean Common Market-and be-
cause of the political unwillingness of the States concerned to enter
into such a closely integrated association.
Other existing regional schemes may provide more realistic mod-
els. For instance, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (CSCE), an interregional organization embracing European
countries as well as the United States and Canada, has been successful
in guiding its thirty-five members without actually formalizing legally
binding standards of conduct. An Irish official with whom we spoke
credited the CSCE's policies in the area of human rights with encour-
aging his country to protest internal political events in Poland, which
is also a member of the Conference. The official also pointed out that
Ireland failed to oppose various U.S. actions in Central America be-
cause the latter is not considered part of Ireland's proper sphere of
concern.
According to a number of LAs, international lawyers should wel-
come the addition of regional organizations to the international legal
community, because such organizations promote long-term security
and progress by providing Member States with nonintrusive means of
mutual influence, as well as offer an opportunity for States to bind
themselves under standards too specific for broader agreements.
2. Enhancing the Role of the Reciprocity Principle
A French LA with whom we spoke emphasized that increased re-
ciprocal relations are necessary for international law to prosper. He
also predicted that law will play an increasingly important role in
technical fields such as transportation and aviation, as well as in fish-
ing, navigation, commerce, and diplomatic relations.
In contrast, it was possible to discern among LAs widespread skep-
ticism toward the prospect of community-oriented legal standards ac-
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quiring more weight and greater impact on international relations.
However, a number of LAs concluded that values transcending recip-
rocal State interests are likely to be implemented within the regional
or interregional organizations referred to previously. In such cases,
the existence of multilateral tribunals and the possibility of airing com-
munity values may help these values play a stronger role in interstate
dealings.
3. Clarifying International Legal Standards
Many of the LAs and former policymakers we interviewed agreed
that the vagueness of international law provided States with a lot of
latitude in decisionmaking. One of the best ways to enhance strict
compliance with international law would be to reduce the maneuver-
ing room from which States currently benefit.
This, however, is a long-term task primarily for international
courts. They are no doubt the entities best suited for clarifying and
determining the exact content of loose legal rules. But States could
further the implementation of this objective by drafting clear legal
standards into future treaties.
4. Making Compliance With International Law Compulsory Under
Municipal Law
I have mentioned above that a few national constitutions require
policymakers to respect fundamental principles of international law.54
In these cases foreign ministers and other national policymakers are
duty-bound under domestic law to live up to international legal stan-
dards. Thus, in these countries, international law carries more weight.
As a former American LA indicated, the legal view prevailing in the
United States is that the president cannot breach its international
treaty obligations because they are incorporated into "the supreme
Law of the Land" 55 by the U.S. Constitution. "[T]he supreme Law of
the Land," however, does not encompass customary international law.
Thus, while a decision to ignore customary international law could
entangle the United States in the international sphere, it would not
transgress the U.S. Constitution.
Whatever the value of this view, it is beyond dispute that imposing
respect for international law at a domestic level would greatly enhance
compliance with such standards. A case in point is the area covered in
54. See supra note 37 and the accompanying text.
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
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the United States by the War Powers Resolution,5 6 which outlines
procedures for involving U.S. troops in international hostilities. Be-
cause the resolution lays a domestic legal framework over foreign pol-
icy decisions made by the president, one LA told us that officials in the
executive branch normally consult the State Department legal adviser
to determine whether proposed international actions will invoke the
War Powers Resolution. 57
It would therefore prove important for national constitutions or
federal statutes to incorporate, if not a general duty for State agencies
to comply with international law, at least the duty to abide by the
most fundamental principles of that body of law. Those bound by
such a duty would of course include policymakers in the foreign
ministries.
B. Augmenting the Legal Advisers' Role in Formulating Foreign
Policy
If multilateral and regional organizations continue to grow in stat-
ure and authority-as they must if international law is to increase in
importance-foreign ministries must expect to deal with a proportion-
ately larger amount of work. This growth of legal institutions would
benefit countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States,
that grant lawyers considerable flexibility in defining their duties. At
the same time, however, countries such as Ireland, Italy, and Hungary
may be faced with unanticipated diplomatic difficulties due to the in-
sufficient legal staffing of their foreign ministries.
Based on the information gathered from the interviews as well as a
survey of the existing legal literature on the LAs' varied roles,58 I am
proposing the following suggestions to improve the role of LAs and to
further States' compliance with international legal standards. These
suggestions are subject, of course, to the above caveat regarding the
56. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
57. For insight on the LA's role in advising U.S. officials on War Powers Resolution proce-
dures, see Letter from James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, to Henry A. Kissinger, Secre-
tary of State (Sept. 21, 1974) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law);
Memorandum of Legal Review of Deployment Orders from the General Counsel of the Dept. of
Defense to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (Dec. 1984) (copy on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law); Memorandum on War Powers Resolution from Martin
R. Hoffman to Major General John A. Wickham Jr. (July 8, 1974) (copy on file with the Michi-
gan Journal of International Law); Letter from Linwood Holton, Assistant Secretary for Con-
gressional Relations, to Sen. Thomas Eagleton, United States Senate (May 10, 1974) (copy on file
with the Michigan Journal of International Law); Letter from Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of
State, to James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 7, 1974) (copy on file with the Michi-
gan Journal of International Law).
58. See, eg., Ronald St. John Macdonald, supra note 31, at 377 and the works cited at 476.
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problematic relationship between LAs and States' respect for interna-
tional law.
1. Selecting Legal Advisers From the Private Sector
It is widely believed that LAs should be as independent as possible
from the authority of policymakers, to afford them the independence
to disagree and, if necessary, to distance themselves from foreign pol-
icy decisions that appear contrary to international law. Under this
approach, one would select LAs from the ranks of academics or prac-
ticing attorneys, as is done in Italy, the United States, and France.
This theory maintains that if LAs are selected from the ranks of career
diplomats and government bureaucrats, they are less likely to argue
aggressively for strict compliance with international law because they
come from within the system. Thus, diplomats-turned-LAs might be
less likely than outside candidates to challenge authority over im-
proper decisions or to insist upon early input into the decision-making
processes.
A comment made by several LAs supports this contention. They
spoke of the drawbacks created by filling the legal adviser's post with a
civil servant whose whole career, by definition, is tied to continued
ministry employment, and who may therefore be reluctant to rock the
boat. In contrast, LAs who come to the office from the university,
bench, or private bar could be expected to have greater independence
because the consequences of offering unpopular advice would be less
serious: if things didn't work out, they could simply return to academ-
ics or private practice. In fact, such independence might even enhance
their reputations in the private sector, where solid legal skills are
respected more than political kowtowing. 59 Thus, selection methods
that promote professional independence are essential for ensuring that
policymakers are provided with sound, objective legal advice.
Whether LAs should be political appointees rather than "neutral"
academics or practitioners is still under debate. Political appoint-
ments are apparently not well regarded in Europe because non-polit-
ical appointees are considered to be more impartial and less
susceptible to influence by politicians. On the other hand, political
appointments are considered quite appropriate for the U.S. system.
According to a number of current American LAs and one former LA,
filling a political appointment has its advantages: (a) the appointee has
greater equality with the policymakers; (b) political appointees gener-
59. This point was stressed by the LAs from France, Israel, and the United States, and was
alluded to by advisers from several other countries.
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ally come from the same social set as policymakers and are considered
to be their social equals; (c) unlike the career civil servant who must
appease his superiors to keep his job, the political appointee knows
that might not have a job in the next administration and therefore
enjoys more autonomy; (d) because political appointees normally
move out of the State Department into private practice, the incentive
is strong to maintain an untarnished reputation; and (e) political ap-
pointees are more likely to be attuned to the political pressures of for-
eign policy. Because few international law problems have black and
white solutions, the LA's office needs to be sensitive to political con-
cerns so that it can offer advice that the policymakers will be less likely
to reject.
2. Restructuring the Legal Advisers' Office
The Swiss method of dividing its offices according to functions-
long-range planning versus daily affairs-could prove useful by in-
creasing the amount of LAs' work without losing sight of broad gen-
eral issues. Such a division of labor would require that one chief
lawyer deal with routine daily matters-from top concerns to minor
issues-while the other concentrates on long-term policy planning and
other issues of general importance.
A drawback to this approach, however, is that many countries
would need to hire several more lawyers before they could follow
either the Swiss or the U.S. structure, or some combination of both.
But such a move would be worthwhile. Nations such as Ireland, Italy,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Israel, and Brazil must increase the number of
lawyers working in their ministries if the law is to play an enhanced
role in policy formulation. Furthermore, departments must ensure
that their lawyers are well-trained and receive adequate administrative
support. Although every interviewee in our research insisted that law-
yers in their departments were well-educated, they admitted that their
lawyers' effectiveness was nevertheless hindered by insufficient staffing
and support, particularly in smaller countries.
An organizational structure similar to that of the United States
where LAs serve in specific ministerial departments is the best means
of integrating the LAs' duties with those of the other departments.
The division of labor by operational specialties within the legal corps
can lead to the creation or enlargement of institutional authority.
Although the United Kingdom has taken the additional step of post-
ing some of its lawyers abroad, this may not be logistically feasible for
countries with small staffs, and may in fact become unnecessary as
communication technology advances.
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3. Improving Legal Advisers' Access to Information
As stated previously, the LA's role does not necessarily correspond
to the capacity of international law to override nationalistic economic,
political, and diplomatic concerns in any given nation. Nevertheless,
some important conditions greatly hinder meaningful input at the de-
cision-making level.
First, the LA must have access to information. In several coun-
tries-Hungary and Italy, for example-the LA does not have direct
access to the daily cable traffic which enters the ministry. 6° This
means that the LA hears about a given issue only after a non-lawyer
has determined that an international legal principle might be at stake
and has then consulted the LA. Such a system can create numerous
problems. A non-lawyer bureaucrat could miss numerous legal over-
tones in international matters, thus depriving the issue of the LA's
attention.
A Hungarian LA defended his lack of direct access to cables by
noting that time and personnel constraints prevent their thorough re-
view. This observation, however, should be understood as a manifes-
tation of the need for greater staffing of the LA's office, and not as a
reason for maintaining the current system.
4. Improving Access to Policymakers
If LAs are to succeed in introducing international legal considera-
tions into the policy-making calculus, they must also have access to
the policymakers. This is especially crucial because in most cases the
LA is considered to be part of the bureaucracy, not the decision-mak-
ing apparatus. Of course, the closer the relationship, both institution-
ally and personally, between the LA and the decisionmaker, the
greater the likelihood of a solid advocacy of the international legal
perspective.
There is particular danger that the legal perspective will be lost
when the LA is not privy to daily meetings, because diplomats are less
likely to seek the LA's input after they have already discussed policy
options. The LA is excluded in such cases for a number of reasons:
fear on the part of diplomats that the LA will proffer an opinion con-
trary to the decision which they have made; an unwillingness to allow
delays that occur while LAs research what policymakers may regard
as esoteric and irrelevant questions; and the natural reluctance to con-
sider new information that could upset the hard-won conclusions of
previous meetings. Thus, in the absence of formal institutionalization
60. See supra note 36 and the accompanying text.
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of the LA's input, personality factors may freeze the legal perspective
out of the policy-making calculus.
Another essential factor which dramatically affects the extent to
which international legal considerations are incorporated into foreign
policymaking is the question of whether or not the LA has the right to
initiate discussions with the policymakers. This right of initiative
comes in both weak and strong forms. In the weak form, the LA is
provided an opportunity to present legal proposals relevant to a matter
already under consideration by the policymakers. This approach gen-
erally exists in countries like the United States where the LAs partici-
pate in the staff meetings of the policymakers. The stronger version of
the right to initiate-which interviewees from Switzerland and Bulga-
ria both claim to enjoy-involves the right to actuallypropose policy in
foreign affairs, suggesting, for example, that a new treaty be entered
into or a new conference convened.
While it is probably true that some individual LAs, by virtue of
their personal experience, contacts, or charisma, have exercised this
strong form of initiative at different times, institutionally requiring it
from all LAs would encourage originality on the part of the LAs
themselves and would increase policymakers' receptivity to legal ad-
vice. Such a change could accelerate considerably the rate at which
the LA comes to be recognized not merely as the person who trans-
lates foreign policy into legal terms, but also as the person who facili-
tates the utilization of international law in the overall process of
foreign policy formulation.
An additional institutional factor bearing upon the LA's effective-
ness in advocating international legal perspectives is whether the LA
can pass over those officials hierarchically interposed between him and
the key decisionmaker and offer his opinion directly to the top of the
hierarchical structure. The institutional existence of such an option
clearly has the added advantage of functioning as a check on the heads
of other departments, who know that they may have to answer to their
superiors' direct queries on legal matters. Providing a clear pathway
for the LA to report to key decisionmakers that proposed policies
could violate international law is essential because intermediary au-
thorities might not understand the intricacies of such advice.
One possible means of ensuring that the LA has all the rights to
information and access to the top policymakers may well be the up-
grading of the LAs' status within foreign ministries so as to enable
them structurally to have a greater role in the decision-making
process.
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5. Increasing Public Accountability for Legal Advisers' Decisions
Finally, exposing LAs' activities to regular public discussion would
help ensure their accountability for advocating respect of international
legal standards. As recently suggested by the Joint Committee estab-
lished by the American Society of International Law and the Ameri-
can Branch of the International Law Association, an annual review
and public assessment of LA activities by professional bodies of law-
yers could provide legal advisers with important feedback and new
ideas.61 Such reviews could also stimulate LAs to improve their per-
formance. The LAs, of course, would have to furnish these profes-
sional associations with at least a summary of the issues they had dealt
with over the year, and also would have to participate in the reviews.
Admittedly, in some cases LAs might find it inappropriate to air deli-
cate decisions involving politics or national security, or to raise issues
still under consideration by legal or policy-making authorities. In
such cases, perhaps the chair of the reviewing committee could negoti-
ate with the given LA over which issues needed to be kept confidential
because of their political or security implications, or because they were
still under debate.
What matters is that LAs should feel accountable to public opinion
and, even more importantly, to the expert opinion of professional
gatherings of a professional reviewing committee. Greater accounta-
bility would ensure transparency, even in the traditional sanctuary of
quiet diplomacy. LAs would feel more and more compelled in their
daily activities to choose options consonant with international legal
standards.
CONCLUSION
At present, greater respect for international law is badly needed to
ensure the smoother conduct of international relations. One of the
best ways to promote respect for international law lies to a large extent
in enhancing the importance of LAs in foreign ministries. If States
were to gradually rethink the role of LAs, improve the methods of
their appointments, upgrade their functions, and ensure their indepen-
dence, the stage could be set for expanding the rule of law in interna-
tional relations.
61. Joint Committee of the American Society of International Law & American Branch of
the International Law Association, The Role of the Legal Advisor in the Department of State, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 358, 367-68 (1991). This committee is currently examining the LA's role in the
U.S. State Department.
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